]> CRYPTO-PRO, Ltd.

16/5, Suschevskij val Moscow 127018 Russia +7 (495) 780 48 20 +7 (495) 660 2330 chudov@CryptoPro.ru http://www.CryptoPro.ru

CRYPTO-PRO, Ltd.

16/5, Suschevskij val Moscow 127018 Russia +7 (495) 933 11 68 +7 (495) 933 11 68 lse@CryptoPro.ru http://www.CryptoPro.ru

Security - GOST 28147-89 GOST R 34.10-94 GOST R 34.11-94 GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST 34.310-95 GOST 34.311-95 GOST 34.310-2004 This document is intended to register new cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, according to the procedure specified in TLS Protocol standards. These cipher suites are based on Russian national cryptographic standards - GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys, GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm and GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm.

This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support GOST R 34.11-94 digest, GOST 28147-89 encryption and VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 key exchange algorithms. The cipher suites defined here were proposed by CRYPTO-PRO Company for the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement" community. Algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST 28147-89 and GOST R 34.11-94 have been developed by Russian Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information (FAGCI) and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". They are described in , , and (, , ). Algorithms VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 and PRF_GOSTR3411 are described in . This document defines two configurations: anonymous client - authenticated server (only server provides a certificate); authenticated client - authenticated server (client and server exchange certificates). The presentation language used here is the same as in . Since this specification extends , these descriptions should be merged with those in the TLS specification and any others that extend TLS. This means, that enum types may not specify all possible values and structures with multiple formats chosen with a select() clause may not indicate all possible cases. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in .

The cipher suites defined here use the following key exchange algorithms: CipherSuite Key Exchange Algorithm TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT VKO GOST R 34.10-94 TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 VKO GOST R 34.10-94 TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 Key derivation algorithms based on GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys (VKO GOST R 34.10-94, VKO GOST R 34.10-2001) are described in .

The cipher suites described here use HMAC and TLS PRF, as described in section 5 of , based on GOST R 34.11-94 hash function (HMAC_GOSTR3411 and PRF_GOSTR3411), with parameter set identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (refer to ). The same PRF MUST be used for all dependent protocols, such as . GOST R 34.10-94/2001 signature is used for CertificateVerify message. GOST R 34.11 digest algorithm () is used for CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash and Finished.verify_data (see sections 7.4.10 and 7.4.11 of )

The following cipher algorithm and MAC functions are used (for details refer to ): CipherSuite Cipher MAC TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147 TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147 TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 - HMAC_GOSTR3411 TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 - HMAC_GOSTR3411 For all four cipher suites, the use of MAC is slighttly different from the one, described in section 6.2.3.1 of for standard stream ciphers, where MAC is calculated from the following data:

MACed_data[seq_num] = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length + TLSCompressed.fragment;

Cipher suites defined in this document use the same input for first record, but for each consequent record the input from all previous records is concatenated:

MACed_data[0] + ... + MACed_data[n]

GOST 28147-89 uses 256-bit key size and 8-byte IV. Cipher suites, defined here, use GOST 28147-89 as a stream cipher in counter mode with S-box parameter from id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (see ) and CryptoPro key meshing algorithm. IMIT_GOST28147 is GOST 28147-89 in "IMITOVSTAVKA" mode (4 bytes)

Key calculation is done according to section 6.3 of , using PRF_GOSTR3411. The parameters are as follows:

SecurityParameters.enc_key_length = 32 SecurityParameters.mac_key_length = 32 SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length = 8

Length of necessary key material is 144 bytes.

For these cipher suites this message is required and it MUST contain a certificate, with a public key algorithm matching ServerHello.cipher_suite.

This message MUST NOT be used in these cipher suites, because all the parameters necessary are present in server certificate (see ).

This message is used as described in section 7.4.4 of , and extended as follows:

enum { gostr341094(21), gostr34102001(22),(255) } ClientCertificateType;

gostr341094 and gostr34102001 certificate types identify that the server accepts GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public key certificates.

enum{ gostr3411(XX) } HashAlgorithm; enum{ gostr341094(XX), gostr34102001(XX) } SignatureAlgorithm;

gostr3411 hash type identifes that the server accepts GOST R 34.11-94 hash function. It is RECOMMENDED to populate CertificateRequest.certificate_hash only with gostr3411 value, when one of the cipher suites described in this document is chosen. The server SHOULD populate supported_signature_algorithm field with SignatureAndHashAlgorithm pairs, where HashAlgorithm equals gostr3411 and SignatureAlgorithm matches corresponding ClientCertificateType.

This message is used as described in section 7.4.7 of , it is required for these suites, and contains DER-encoded TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure .

enum { vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm; struct { select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob; } exchange_keys; } ClientKeyExchange;

ASN1-syntax for this structure is:

TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE { keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport, proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL } TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE { keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport, cert OCTET STRING }

GostR3410-KeyTransport is defined in . keyBlob.transportParameters MUST be present. keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey MUST be present if the server didn't request client certificate or client's public key algorithm and parameters do not match those of the recipient. Else it SHOULD be omited. proxyKeyBlobs - (optional) contains key exchange for secondary recipients (for example, for the firewall, which audits connections). cert - contains secondary recipient's certificate. Actions of client: First, the client generates a random 32-byte premaster_secret. Then shared_ukm is calculated as first 8 bytes of digest of concatenated client random and server random:

shared_ukm = GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7]

Then client chooses a sender key. If keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey is present, the corresponding secret key MUST be used as a sender key. If it is missing, the secret key, corresponding to the client certificate MUST be used. Using the sender key and recipient's public key, algorithm VKO GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 (described in ) is applied to produce KEK. VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 is used with shared_ukm as UKM. Then CryptoPro Key Wrap algorithm is applied to encrypt premaster_secret and produce CEK_ENC and CEK_MAC. Again, shared_ukm is used as UKM. keyBlob.transportParameters.encryptionParamSet is used for all encryption operations. The resulting encrypted key (CEK_ENC) is placed in keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.encryptedKey field, it's mac (CEK_MAC) is placed in keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey field, and shared_ukm (UKM) is placed in keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm field. Actions of server: Server MUST verify, that keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is equal to GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7], before decrypting the premaster_secret. Server applies VKO GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001, (depending on the client public key type), and CryptoPro Key Unwrap algorithm in the simillar manner to decrypt the premaster_secret. Server MUST verify keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey after decrypting the premaster_secret.

This message is used as described in section 7.4.8 of . If the client have sent both a client certificate and an ephemeral public key, it MUST send a certificate verify message, as a proof of possession of the private key for provided certificate. The TLS structures are extended as follows:

enum { gostr341094, gostr34102001 } SignatureAlgorithm; select (SignatureAlgorithm) { case gostr341094: digitally-signed struct { opaque gostr341194_hash[32]; }; case gostr34102001: digitally-signed struct { opaque gostr341194_hash[32]; }; } Signature; CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash = GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)

This message is used as described in section 7.4.9 of .

Finished.verify_data = PRF_GOSTR3411(master_secret, finished_label, GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)) [0..11]

For historical reasons, some applications use the cipher suites specified herein with , using some features of , including cipher-suite dependent PRF, Finished and Certificate Verify computations.

It is RECOMMENDED that software applications verify signature values, subject public keys and algorithm parameters to conform to , standards prior to their use. Use of the same key for signature and key derivation is NOT RECOMMENDED. It is RECOMMENDED for both client and server to verify the private key usage period, if this extension is present in the certificate. The cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT and TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT proposed hereby, have been analyzed by special certification laboratory of Scientific and Technical Centre "ATLAS" in appropriate levels of target_of_evaluation (TOE). It is RECOMMENDED to subject the implementations of these cipher suites to examination by an authorized agency with approved methods of cryptographic analysis.

This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values presented here are used by several implementations of the same cipher suites for TLS 1.0, and were described in previous drafts. They are currently listed in the registry as reserved. IANA is requested to update the TLS Cipher Suite registry defined in [RFC5246] with these values.

CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0x00,0x80} CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0x00,0x81} CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x82} CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x83}

This document defines the following new client certificate types, whose values presented here are used by several implementations of the same suites for TLS 1.0, and were described in previous drafts. They are currently listed in the registry as reserved. IANA is requested to update the TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Registry defined in [RFC5246] with these values.

enum { gostr341094(21), gostr34102001(22) } ClientCertificateType;

This document defines the following new signature algorithm types, whose values are to be assigned from the TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry defined in [RFC5246].

enum{ gostr341094(XX), gostr34102001(XX) } SignatureAlgorithm;

This document defines the following new hash algorithm types, whose values are to be assigned from the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry defined in [RFC5246].

enum { gostr3411(XX) } HashAlgorithm;

This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. <p>This document describes the cryptographic algorithms and parameters supplementary to the original GOST specifications, GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94, for use in Internet applications. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</p> <p>This document supplements RFC 3279. It describes encoding formats, identifiers, and parameter formats for the algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 for use in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). [STANDARDS TRACK]</p> <p>This document describes the conventions for using the cryptographic algorithms GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The CMS is used for digital signature, digest, authentication, and encryption of arbitrary message contents. [STANDARDS TRACK]</p> Government Committee of the USSR for Standards ????? Government Committee of the Russia for Standards Government Committee of the Russia for Standards Government Committee of the Russia for Standards Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk Harvard University

1350 Mass. Ave. Cambridge MA 02138 - +1 617 495 3864 sob@harvard.edu

General keyword In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. Authors who follow these guidelines should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document: The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. Note that the force of these words is modified by the requirement level of the document in which they are used. Microsoft Corporation

One Microsoft Way Redmond WA 98052 US +1 425 936 6605 bernarda@microsoft.com

Microsoft Corporation

One Microsoft Way Redmond WA 98052 US +1 425 936 6711 dansimon@microsoft.com

The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) provides a standard method for transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links. PPP also defines an extensible Link Control Protocol (LCP), which can be used to negotiate authentication methods, as well as an Encryption Control Protocol (ECP), used to negotiate data encryption over PPP links, and a Compression Control Protocol (CCP), used to negotiate compression methods. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a PPP extension that provides support for additional authentication methods within PPP. Transport Level Security (TLS) provides for mutual authentication, integrity-protected ciphersuite negotiation and key exchange between two endpoints. This document describes how EAP-TLS, which includes support for fragmentation and reassembly, provides for these TLS mechanisms within EAP. Certicom

tdierks@certicom.com

Certicom

callen@certicom.com

This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. ISO/IEC

Additional ASN.1 modules, referenced here, can be found in and .

Gost-CryptoPro-TLS { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1) gost-CryptoPro-TLS(16) 1 } DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS All -- -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for -- use in the other ASN.1 modules contained within the Russian -- Cryptography "GOST" & "GOST R" Specifications, and for the use -- of other applications which will use them to access Russian -- Cryptography services. Other applications may use them for -- their own purposes, but this will not constrain extensions and -- modifications needed to maintain or improve the Russian -- Cryptography service. IMPORTS Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)} id-CryptoPro-algorithms, gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax FROM Cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1) cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions(0) 1 } GostR3410-KeyTransport FROM GostR3410-EncryptionSyntax gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax ; id-PRF-GostR3411-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-CryptoPro-algorithms prf-gostr3411-94(23) } TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE { keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport, cert OCTET STRING } TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE { keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport, proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL } TLSGostSrvKeyExchange ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {Certificate}) TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier } TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::= SEQUENCE OF TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::= TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect END -- Gost-CryptoPro-TLS

This document was created in accordance with "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement", signed by FGUE STC "Atlas", CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TS, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI), Cryptocom, R-Alpha. The aim of this agreement is to achieve mutual compatibility of the products and solutions. The authors wish to thank: Microsoft Corporation Russia for provided information about company products and solutions, and also for technical consulting in PKI. RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd for active colaboration and critical help in creation of this document. NIP Informzachita for compatibility testing of the proposed data formats while incorporating them into company products. Citrix Inc for help in compatibility testing Citrix products for Microsoft Windows. Russ Hously (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) for initiative, creating this document.

Author's Addresses Alexandr Afanasiev Factor-TS office 711, 14, Presnenskij val, Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation EMail: afa1@factor-ts.ru Nikolaj Nikishin Infotecs GmbH p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt, Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru Boleslav Izotov FGUE STC "Atlas" 38, Obraztsova, Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation EMail: izotov@nii.voskhod.ru Elena Minaeva MD PREI build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per., Moscow, Russian Federation EMail: evminaeva@mail.ru Serguei Murugov R-Alpha 4/1, Raspletina, Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation EMail: msm@top-cross.ru Igor Ustinov Cryptocom office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru Anatolij Erkin SPRCIS (SPbRCZI) 1, Obrucheva, St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation EMail: erkin@nevsky.net